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I. INTRODUCTION
Each year more than 200,000 children in the United States are abducted by family 
members.1  When a child is abducted across international borders, the difficulties are 
compounded.2  Since the late 1970s, The Department of State’s Office of Children’s Issues has 
been contacted in approximately 16,000 cases involving children who were either abducted from 
the United States or prevented from returning to the U.S. by one of their parents.3
At the Hague Conference on Private International Law in 1976, twenty three nations 
agreed to draft a treaty to deter international child abduction.4  The Hague Convention on the 
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Convention”) was adopted on October 24, 
1980 by the Fourteenth Session of The Hague Conference by a unanimous vote of the States 
which were present.5  Canada, France, Greece and Switzerland were the first four States to sign 
the Convention, immediately following the Conference.6  The Convention was incorporated into 
United States law and came into force in the U.S. on July 1, 1988.7
1 See Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Committed to Keeping America’s Children Safe (Aug. 6, 2002), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/08/print/20020806.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) 
[hereinafter White House Fact Sheet]. 
2 See U.S. Dep’t State, International Child Abduction, available at
http://travel.state.gov/family/abduction/abduction_580.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2005).
3 See id. 
4 See U.S. Dep’t State, Hague Convention Abduction Issues One Possible Solution – The Hague Convention 
available at http://travel.state.gov/family/abduction/hague_issues/hague_issues_578.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) 
[hereinafter One Possible Solution].
5 See Elisa Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention, ¶ 1 (Apr. 1981), 
available at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/expl28.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Pérez-Vera]. The states 
present and voting for the adoption of the Convention were: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.
6 See id. 
7 See One Possible Solution, supra note 4.
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The Convention reflects a worldwide concern about the harmful effects that parental 
kidnapping has on children and a strong desire for an effective deterrent to such conduct.8
Currently, there are seventy-five international states contracting with the Convention.9
This article will discuss the issue of international child abduction, where a petition for 
return has been brought under The Hague Convention, and the respondent contends that the 
abduction was a result of domestic violence and/or child abuse.  First, Part II of the article will 
provide extensive background on the provisions of The Hague Convention and relevant United 
States laws.  Next, Part III will discuss cases where the courts have heard evidence of domestic 
violence and/or child abuse and their outcomes.  Third, the article will discuss some of the 
advantages and challenges of the Convention as it is currently adopted.  Finally, some 
recommendations for improvement will be made.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
The intent of the Convention is “to protect children internationally from the harmful 
effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt 
8 See Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494 (March 26, 
1986).
9 See Hague Conference on Private International Law: Status Table Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction (June 2005), available at http://hcch.e-
vision.nl/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24 (last visited Jan. 4, 2006) [hereinafter Convention Status 
Table]. The contracting states are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, People's Republic of China, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, 
France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Serbia and Montenegro, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.
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return to the State of their habitual residence.”10  Thus, the Convention has two objectives.  First, 
it seeks to prevent the international removal of children by creating a system of close cooperation 
among the judicial and administrative authorities of the Contracting States and is not concerned 
with the law applicable to the custody of children.11  Second, it has the purpose to secure the 
immediate reintegration of the child into his or her habitual environment.12  While each of these 
objectives corresponds to a specific idea of what constitutes the best interest of the child,13 this is 
not the primary concern of the Convention, which is to secure the prompt return of a child to 
their State of habitual residence.
The Convention assumes that questions of custody rights, including consideration of what 
is in the best interest of the child, should take place before competent authorities in the State 
where the child had their habitual residence prior to removal.14  It may be argued that the 
Convention’s object in securing the return of the child ought to be subordinate to a consideration 
of the child’s best interests,15 however, “a legal standard for the best interests of the child is at 
first view of such vagueness that it seems to resemble more closely a sociological paradigm than 
10
 The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, (25 Oct. 1980) available at
http://patriot.net/~crouch/hague.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Hague Convention].
11 See Pérez-Vera, supra note 5, at ¶ 35.
12 See id. at ¶ 25.  
13 See id. 
14 See id. at ¶ 19.
15 See id. at ¶ 20.  
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a concrete juridical standard.”16  This view has been followed by courts in a number of countries, 
including the United States.17
The Convention applies only to wrongful removals or retentions between Contracting 
States occurring after its entry into force in those States.18  The removal or retention of a child is 
considered wrongful where it is in breach of rights of custody, which were actually exercised, 
under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately prior to the 
removal or retention.19  The Convention provides for four situations where a court in a 
Contracting State may at their discretion refuse to order the return of a child:20
1. a period of more than one year has elapsed since the date of the wrongful removal or 
retention;21
2. the person claiming that the child was wrongfully removed or retained was not actually 
exercising custody rights or has subsequently acquiesced to the child’s removal or 
retention;22
16 See id. at ¶ 21 citing Questionnaire and Report on International child abduction by one parent, prepared by Mr. 
Adair Dyer, Prel. Doc. No. 1, 22-23 (Aug. 1977).
17 See Thompson v. Thompson, [1994] 119 D.L.R. 4th 253 (Can.) (The Supreme Court of Canada held that “it was 
not the function of a Court of the requested state to concern itself with the best interests of the child as the 
Convention anticipated that that decision would be made by the home state); see also B v. El-B, [2003] Fam. 299 
(U.K.) (The court held that whether it was in the children's best interests to return to Lebanon for their future was to 
be decided under the Sharia law); see also Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1068 (6th Cir. 1996) citing Hague 
International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,510 (the exceptions under 
the convention were not intended to be used by defendants as a vehicle to litigate, or religitate, the child’s best 
interests).
18 See Hague Convention, supra note 10, at art. 35.
19 See Hague Convention, supra note 10, at art. 3.  
20
 See Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,509; see also 
Pérez-Vera, supra note 5, at ¶ 113.
21 See Hague Convention, supra note 10, at art. 12.  This provision was an attempt to acknowledge that, even after a 
wrongful removal or retention, a child will at some point become “settled in its new environment.” See Pérez-Vera, 
supra note 5, at ¶ 107.  Once this has occurred, a return should take place “only after an examination of the merits of 
the custody rights exercised over it – something outside of the scope of the Convention.” See id.
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3. there is a grave risk that returning the child would expose the child to physical or 
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation;23 or
4. the return of the child would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the 
requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.24
The burden of proving the necessary facts is imposed on the person who opposes the return of 
the child.25  A finding that one or more of the exceptions are applicable does not, however, make 
refusal of a return order mandatory.26  The courts retain discretion to order the child returned 
even if they consider that one or more of the exceptions apply.27
Following a long-established tradition of the Hague Conference, the Convention avoided 
defining many of its terms,28 leaving them to the courts of the Contracting States to interpret.29
This includes terms such as habitual residence, removal, retention, and grave risk of harm.  Also 
not clearly stated, are the burdens of proof required to find one or more of the exceptions to be 
applicable.  Not surprisingly, the result is inconsistencies in the application of the Convention 
22 See Hague Convention, supra note 10, at art. 13(a). 
23 See id. at art. 13(b).  
24 See id. at art. 20. 
25 See Pérez-Vera, supra note 5, at ¶ 114.
26 See Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,509.
27 See id. 
28 See Pérez-Vera, supra note 5, at ¶ 53 (The only terms defined in the Convention are those in article 5 concerning 
custody, where it was absolutely necessary to establish the scope of the Convention’s subject matter). 
29 See Nigel Lowe, International Forum on Parental Child Abduction: Hague Convention Action Agenda Held Sept 
15-15, 1998 (1999), available at http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC84.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 
2005) [hereinafter Lowe–Action Agenda].
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both between Contracting States and within courts of Contracting States, such as the United 
States.30
There is agreement that the exceptions are to be interpreted narrowly.31  It was generally 
believed that the courts in the Contracting States would understand and fulfill this objective and 
allow exceptions only in clearly meritorious cases, and only when the person opposing the return 
had met the burden of proof.32
The relatively small number of return applications that have been refused on the basis of 
Articles 13(b) and 20 appear to confirm this.33  An analysis of the applications made in 1999 
under the Convention showed that only eleven percent of the 954 return applications involving 
1,394 children resulted in judicial refusal to return the child.34
30 See Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), A Family Resource Guide on International 
Parental Kidnapping, 50 (2002), available at http://www.ncjrsorg/pdffiles1/ojjdp/190448.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 
2005) [hereinafter OJJDP Family Resource Guide].
31 See Pérez-Vera, supra note 5, at ¶ 34 (exceptions are to be interpreted in a restrictive fashion if the Convention is 
not to become a dead letter); see also Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51 
Fed. Reg. at 10,509 (any exception must be drawn narrowly lest their application undermine the express purpose of 
the Convention – to effect the prompt return of abducted children).
32 See Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,509.
33 See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Fourth Meeting of 
the Special Committee to Review the Operation of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects 
of International Child Abduction (22-28 March 2001) (20 Apr. 2001), available at http://hcch.e-
vision.nl/upload/concl28sc4_e.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2005).  Article 13(b) provides that a court in a Contracting 
State may, at their discretion, refuse to order the return of a child if there is a grave risk that returning the child 
would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation; 
Article 20 provides for similar discretion where the return of the child would not be permitted by the fundamental 
principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.  See The 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, arts. 13(b), 20 (25 Oct. 1980), available at
http://patriot.net/~crouch/hague.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2005).
34 See Nigel Lowe et al., A Statistical Analysis of Applications made in 1999 under the Hague Convention of 25 
October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 10, 12 (Rev. Mar. 2002), available at
http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/abd2001pd3e.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Lowe–Statistical Analysis].
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While Article 13(b) was the reason most often relied upon for refusal to return, only 
twenty-one judicial refusals were granted on this basis.35  In order for a person opposing a child’s 
return to show that the return would place the child in an “intolerable situation” the person 
opposing the return must show that the risk to the child is “grave” and not merely serious.36  It is 
interesting to note that while thirty percent of the parents removing a child were male and sixty-
nine percent female,37 ninety percent of the applications refused on the basis of Article 13(b) 
involved female taking persons.38  Since the overwhelming number of victims of domestic 
violence are female,39 this may provide one explanation for the high percentage of female taking 
persons opposing the return of their child on this basis.
Article 20 was not relied upon in any case studied as a reason for refusing a return 
application.40  This may be attributed to the fact that this rule was incorporated into the 
Convention as a “public policy clause,”41 which has a difficult burden to meet.  The intent of 
Article 20 was to include a provision “that could be invoked on the rare occasion that return of a 
child would utterly shock the conscience of the court and offend all notions of due process.”42
Whereas the Convention is only enforceable between Contracting States it does not seek 
to establish a system for the return of children that is exclusively for the benefit of the 
35 See id. at 17.
36 See Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,510.
37 See Lowe-Statistical Analysis, supra note 34, at 8 (numbers do not total 100% due to incomplete data available).
38 See  id. at 18. 
39 See ABA Comm’n on Domestic Violence, available at http://www.abanet.org/domviol/stats.html (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2005) (90 - 95% of domestic violence victims are women).
40
 Lowe-Statistical Analysis, supra note 34, at 18. 
41 See Pérez-Vera, supra note 5, at ¶ 31. 
42 See Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,510.
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Contracting States.43  It is put forward rather as an additional means for helping persons whose 
custody or access rights have been breached.44  The Convention has begun to influence some 
non-Hague countries where courts now look for guidance to the non-hostile pattern of resolution 
employed in Hague cases.45  The Convention’s increasing success is also encouraging more 
countries to become party to the convention.46
B. International Child Abduction Remedies Act
The International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”)47 was enacted to establish 
procedures for the implementation and enforcement of The Hague Convention in the United 
States.48  ICARA does not provide any substantive rights; it is merely a procedural mechanism 
allowing access to the remedies provided in the Convention in the United States.49  The 
provisions of ICARA are in addition to and not in lieu of the provisions of the Convention.50
Courts must therefore look to the Convention as well as ICARA when determining claims 
brought under ICARA.51
43 See Pérez-Vera, supra note 5, at ¶ 139.  
44 See id.  
45 See U.S. Dep’t State Bureau of Consular Affairs, International Child Abduction (1995), available at
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/population/children/9501.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Consular 
Affairs].
46 See id.
47
 International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-1161 (2005).
48 See id. at § 11601(b)(1).
49
 Scott M. Smith, J.D., Annotation, Construction and Application of International Child Abduction Remedies Act 
(44 U.S.C. §§ 11601 ET SEQ.), 125 A.L.R. FED 217 (2005) [hereinafter Smith].
50 See International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 11601(b)(2).
51
 Smith, supra note 49. 
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An action brought under the Convention is a civil action brought by the person seeking 
the return of a child (petitioner) in any court authorized to exercise jurisdiction in the place 
where the child is located at the time the petition is filed.52  ICARA provides that the courts of 
the States and the United States district courts shall have concurrent original jurisdiction over 
actions arising under the Convention.53
A petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a child has been 
wrongfully removed or retained, within the meaning of the Convention, to bring an action for the 
return of the child under the Convention.54  A respondent who opposes the return of the child has 
the burden of establishing:
(A) by clear and convincing evidence that one of the exceptions set 
forth in article 13(b) or 20 of the Convention applies; and
(B) by a preponderance of the evidence that any other exception set 
forth in article 12 or 13 of the Convention applies.55
Following the example set forth in the Convention, ICARA also does not define what would 
constitute a “grave risk of harm” or a “violation of fundamental principles relating to the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms” in the United States for the exceptions 
provided for in Articles 13(b) or 20 of the Convention to be applicable.  While providing some 
additional standards and guidance over that which is provided in the Convention, ICARA 
continues to leave significant discretion in the hands of the courts.
52 See International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 11603(b).
53 See id. at § 11603(a).
54 See id. at § 11603(e)(1)(A).
55 Id. at § 11603(e)(2).
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C. International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act
In addition to the civil actions and remedies provided under the Convention, the United 
States has enacted the International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act (“IPKCA”),56 making 
international parental kidnapping a federal felony crime.57
IPKCA provides that:
whoever removed a child from the United States, or attempts to do so, 
or retains a child (who has been in the United States) outside the 
United States with intent to obstruct the lawful exercise of parental 
rights shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 3 
years, or both.58
International parental kidnapping is also a crime under state law, although the provisions of state 
laws vary.59
IPKCA provides three affirmative defenses.  First, the defendant was acting within the 
provisions of a valid custody or visitation order;60 second, the defendant was fleeing an incidence 
or pattern of domestic violence;61 and third, the defendant failed to return the child because of 
circumstances beyond his or her control, notified or made reasonable attempts to notify the other 
parent within twenty four hours, and returned the child as soon as possible.62
56
 International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1204 (Apr. 30, 2003).
57 See OJJDP Family Resource Guide, supra note 30, at 73.
58
 International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act § 1204(a).
59 See OJJDP Family Resource Guide, supra note 30, at 69.
60 See International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act § 1204(c)(1). 
61 See id. at § 1204(c)(2).
62 See id. at § 1204(c)(3). 
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IPKCA is not intended to detract from The Hague Convention,63 but rather provide an 
additional or alternative remedy.  The civil and criminal justice systems serve different purposes 
with respect to child abduction.64  The former serves to return the child, while the later serves to 
punish the abductor.65  Criminal charges are aimed at the wrongdoer and do not address child 
recovery.66  Although a child may be located and recovered in the course of a criminal 
investigation, a parent cannot rely on the criminal process for a child’s return.67   Ordinarily a 
parent must pursue civil means to locate and recover a child at the same time as a prosecutor is 
pursuing a criminal investigation.68
IPKCA expresses Congress’ sense that, where applicable, the Convention should be the 
option of first choice for a parent who seeks the return of a child who has been removed.69
Where The Hague Convention is not applicable, because the child has been removed to or 
retained in a non-Contracting State, a parent may be criminally charged under IPKCA and if the 
abductor has fled the country to avoid prosecution extradition may be sought for federal and state 
violations.70  Further, criminal prosecution of an individual may be pursued under IPKCA after a 
child has been returned pursuant to Hague Convention proceedings.71
63 See International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act § 1204(d).
64 See Patricia N. Hoff, Family Abduction: Prevention and Response, 99 (2002), available at
http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC75.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Hoff].
65 See id. 
66 See id.
67 See id.
68 See id. at 100. 
69 See OJJDP Family Resource Guide, supra note 30, at 74. 
70 See Hoff, supra note 64, at 99. 
71 See United States v. Ventre, 338 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, Ventre v. U.S., 540 U.S. 1085 
(2003).
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It is important to note that IPKCA is the only United States statute that makes a specific 
reference to domestic violence in connection with international parental abduction.72
III. DISCUSSION
A. When is There a Grave Risk of Harm?
Under the Convention, a Court may deny a request to return a child if there is a “grave 
risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise 
place the child in an intolerable situation.”73  Article 13(b) has been cited as a defense to not 
returning a child to their country of habitual residence in forty-nine cases74 of Hague Convention 
petitions brought in the United States.  The courts have found that the standard required under 
Article 13(b) has been met in only ten of these cases.75  In the remaining thirty-nine cases, the 
court either ordered the child(ren) returned to the Hague petitioner or dismissed the petition and 
refused the return of the child(ren) on other grounds.76
72 See International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act § 1204(c)(2).
73
 Hague Convention, supra note 10, at art. 13(b).  
74 See Hague Conference on Private International Law: The International Child Abduction Database (INCADAT) 
Case Law Search, available at http://212.206.44.26/index.cfm?fuseaction=convtext.showDetail&lng=1 (last visited 
Jan. 5, 2006) [hereinafter INCADAT Database].
75 See id. The cases where the courts found that the standard under article 13(b) had been met and refused the return 
of the child(ren) are: D'Assignes v. Escalante, No. BD 051876 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1991), Steffen F. v. Severina P., 966 
F. Supp. 922 (D. Ariz. 1997),  In re K. v. K., No. C 97-0021 SC (N.D. Cal. 1997), Dietschi v. Dietschi, No. 98-2-
14797-1 KNT (Wash. Super. Ct. 1998), T. v. F., (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998), Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 
1999), Dimer v. Dimer, No. 99-2-03610-7SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. 1999), Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204 (1st Cir. 
2000), Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2001), Danaipour v. McLarey 386 F.3d 289 (1st Cir. 2004).  
76 See id.  In most of the cases where the courts refused the return of the child(ren) to the Hague petitioner, the court 
found that the Hague petitioner had not demonstrated that the child had been a habitual resident of the state from 
which they had been removed and therefore the petitioner could not rely on the remedies of The Hague Convention.  
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Friedrich v. Friedrich,77 is viewed as a foundational case in the United States for defining 
a “grave risk of harm.”  In Friedrich, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated (in dicta) that 
they believed 
that a grave risk of harm for the purposes of the Convention can exist 
in only two situations. First, there is a grave risk of harm when return 
of the child puts the child in imminent danger prior to the resolution of 
the custody dispute--e.g., returning the child to a zone of war, famine, 
or disease. Second, there is a grave risk of harm in cases of serious 
abuse or neglect, or extraordinary emotional dependence, when the 
court in the country of habitual residence, for whatever reason, may be 
incapable or unwilling to give the child adequate protection.78
The United States Department of State stated that an “example of an ‘intolerable 
situation’ is one in which a custodial parent sexually abuses the child.”79  If a parent removes or 
retains the child to “safeguard it against further victimization” the court may deny the petition of 
an abusive parent to return the child.80 “Such an action would protect the child from being 
returned to an intolerable situation and subjected to a grave risk of psychological harm.”81  Once 
again, the discretion left to the courts should be noted.  There is no clear requirement that a 
petition be denied in the situation where there is evidence of child abuse.
In Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, the plaintiff father (Nunez-Escudero) appealed the 
order of the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota denying his petition, under 
The Hague Convention, for the return of his six-month-old son to Mexico after the child’s 
77
 Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060 (6th Cir. 1996).
78 See id. at 1069.
79 See Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,510. 
80 See id.
81 Id.
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mother (Tice-Menley) had brought the child to the United States.82  Tice-Menley provided 
affidavits from her parents and a psychologist.83  She alleged that Nunez-Escudero “physically, 
sexually and verbally abused her, and that she was ‘treated as a prisoner’ by her husband and 
father-in-law.”84  She stated that she had seen her father-in-law hit his youngest son with a 
wooden plunger and she feared for her baby’s safety.85  The District Court “determined that there 
was a grave risk that the return of the child would expose him to physical and psychological 
harm and place him in an intolerable situation.”86  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, while 
not stating what evidence would be sufficient, found that the evidence was too general and that 
the District Court had improperly considered the impact of separating the baby from his 
mother.87  The case was remanded to the District Court with instructions that for Tice-Menley to 
prevail, “she must present clear and convincing evidence that the return of the child to Mexico
would subject him to a grave risk of harm or otherwise place him in an intolerable situation.”88
In Ciotola v. Fiocca,89 the plaintiff mother came to the United States from Italy with the 
party’s fifteen-month-old daughter.90  Approximately one month later the defendant began to 
suspect that the plaintiff might not return to Italy and subsequently filed a petition under the 
82 See Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374 (8th Cir. 1995).
83 See id. at 376. 
84 Id.
85 See id.
86 Id.
87 See id. at 377.
88 Id. at 378.
89 Ciotola v. Fiocca, 684 N.E.2d 763 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1997).
90 See id. at 766-67.
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Convention for the return of his daughter.91  The plaintiff objected, and alleged, inter alia, that 
the defendant had an explosive temper, that she had been a victim of domestic violence during 
the marriage, and therefore returning the child to Italy would pose grave psychological harm to 
the child.92  The Magistrate hearing the case found that the plaintiff had failed to establish that 
returning the child to Italy would expose the child to physical or psychological harm.93  On 
appeal, the Court of Common Pleas of Ohio found that the facts surrounding the incidents of 
alleged abuse during the marriage were seriously contested.94  The plaintiff had neither reported 
any situations of abuse to the local authorities nor sought medical attention as a result of 
domestic violence.95  A social report was made concerning the defendant and his extended 
family in their home town in Italy, however, the report concluded that neither the defendant nor 
anyone in his family presented any significant problems that might prove detrimental or harmful 
to the normal physical and psychological development of the minor child.96  Based on the record, 
the court found that the evidence presented at trial did not establish any serious risk that either 
the defendant or any one associated with him would jeopardize the child’s welfare or place her in 
grave risk of physical or psychological harm.97  The minor child was ordered to be immediately 
returned to her father in Italy pursuant to the Hague Convention.98
91 See id.
92 See id. at 769.
93 See id. at 766.
94 See id. at 769.
95 See id.
96 See id.
97 See id.
98 See id. at 771.
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In the Matter of L.L.,99 the petitioner father, a Dutch citizen, sought the return of his two 
children and their half-sister to the Netherlands after they had been removed by the respondent 
mother to New York City.100  Although the testimony of the mother and father was “sharply 
divergent,” testimonies by a New York City Administration for Children’s Services (“ACS”) 
caseworker, a pediatrician at New York Presbyterian Hospital (“NYPH”), a psychiatrist at 
NYPH, and a social worker for the children’s law guardian, regarding their evaluations of the 
children, were consistent “that all three children were fearful of their father; that their father 
threatened to harm them if they disclosed to their mother that he hit them; that their mother 
treated them well; and that they wanted to be cared for by their mother.”101 The psychiatrist 
testified that “all three children had post traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) . . . the cause of the 
PTSD was the excessive corporal punishment and domestic violence and the overall chaotic 
discord in the home.”102
The Family Court of New York found that it was highly likely that the father engaged in 
a pattern of excessive “corporal punishment” with respect to all the children and domestic 
violence towards the mother; however, the court stated that the most important interpretive 
principle with regard to the exceptions under the Convention was that they be interpreted 
narrowly.103  During the course of the proceedings, the court received a letter from the Dutch 
Ministry of Justice which noted that steps would be taken by the Child Protection Board to place 
99 In the Matter of L.L. (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2000), available online at http://www.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0273.htm. 
100 See id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 See id.
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the children in foster care pending an investigation.104  In light of this the Family Court 
concluded that the grave risk exception had not been satisfied.105  The court accepted that 
psychological disturbance could result from the children returning, but while it acknowledged 
that this risk could be considered serious, it did not warrant being described as grave.106 The 
court stated that 
the problem with most “post-traumatic stress” claims of psychological 
harm in a Convention Article 13(b) context is that the claim is too 
broad.  Familial domestic violence and excessive corporal punishment 
are not infrequent, and are commonly accompanied by associated 
psychological disturbances in the affected children.  Were all such 
claims to be routinely granted Article 13(b) exception status . . . 
exception [would] begin to swallow the rule.107
The two younger children were ordered to be returned to the Netherlands subject to the 
conditions referred to in the letter from the Dutch Ministry of Justice.108
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California adopted a less 
narrow standard in the case of In re K. v. K.109  In this case, the court refused the return of the 
child where it found that there was “compelling evidence establishing the potential for serious 
psychological harm.”110
104 See id.
105 See id.
106 See id.
107 Id.
108 See id. The court held that the third child (J) had attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate 
to take into account her view that she does not want to return to the Netherlands, and to give that view virtually 
conclusive weight. See id. Accordingly the Court did not order her return to the Netherlands, although explicitly 
stating that it nonetheless had the discretion to do so. See id.
109 In re K. v. K., No. C 97-0021 SC (N.D. Cal. 1997) available online at
http://www.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0127.htm.
110 Id.
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Mr. K. and Ms. K. resided in Australia with their thirty-two-month-old child.111
According to the report of the Australian police, Mr. K. slapped Ms. K. across the face and 
threatened her with a knife and belt.112  Mr. K. was taken into custody, and when he returned 
home the next day, he discovered that Ms. K. had left with their child.113  Ms. K. departed from 
Australia, with the child, to California.114
The evidence of Mr. K.’s abuse of Ms. K. was relatively limited and there was only one 
statement by Ms. K. alleging any direct threat to the child.115  Nevertheless, the court held that 
“in light of the prior history of alleged abuse and discord that has existed between the parties, . . . 
the return of the child to Australia would pose a grave risk to the child’s well being,”116 and 
denied Mr. K.’s request for the return of the child. 
Steffen F. and Severina P. were married and living in Germany, with their two children -
Jaime F. and Tricia P.117  Approximately two years later, Severina left Germany with the two 
children for the United States.118  Steffen filed a petition for the return for the children pursuant 
to The Hague Convention.119
111 See id. 
112 See id.
113 See id.
114 See id.
115 See id.
116 Id.
117 See Steffen F. v. Severina P., 966 F. Supp. 922, 923 (D. Ariz. 1997) (Jaime was the child of both Severina and 
Steffen, however, Tricia was not Steffen’s natural child).
118 See id.
119 See id. at 925. 
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Evidence was presented at trial indicating that Tricia had been sexually abused, including 
testimony that she had engaged in “inappropriately sexualized conduct” and testimony of a 
clinical psychologist that she had been sexually molested.120  Steffen denied that he had abused 
Tricia and testified that Severina had threatened him with sexual abuse allegations if he contested 
Jaime’s custody.121
Further testimony was presented as to the psychological status of both children.122  The 
clinical psychologist testified that both children were attached and bonded to their mother.123
The doctor testified that removal of Jaime from his mother for any period of time longer than a 
few weeks would likely result in un-bonding and un-attachment, constituting a grave risk of 
psychological harm.124
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona held that Severina had failed 
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Steffen sexually abused Tricia.125  However, 
citing Rydder v. Rydder126 the court stated that “‘specific evidence of potential harm’ to a child 
may constitute grave risk of harm under The Hague Convention.”127   The court held that 
Severina had “established by clear and convincing evidence that Jaime’s return would expose 
120 See id. at 924.
121 See id.
122 See id.
123 See id.
124 See id. at 927.
125 See id. at 930.
126
 Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d 369, 373 (8th Cir. 1995). 
127
 Steffen F. v. Severina P., 966 F. Supp at 927; see also B. v. B., Family Court of Westerberg (1992) (A German 
court found that a grave risk of harm existed should a German child abducted from Texas and taken to Germany be 
returned to Texas, because of the “intensive bond between [German] mother and child”).
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him to grave risk of psychological harm . . . because Jaime ha[d] bonded and attached to his 
mother”128 and refused the return of the children to Germany.
In the case of T. v. F., the mother filed an action in the Dutch courts seeking the 
dissolution of her marriage to the father, and seeking temporary custody of their child.129  Prior 
to this time, the mother had made claims and allegations to the Dutch police that the father had 
sexually abused the child.130  The allegations were based on statements made to her by the child 
that his father “hurt him” and her discovery of the child in the father’s bed with his pajama 
bottoms removed and buried in the sheets.131  The Dutch court awarded temporary custody to the 
father, and declined to investigate and/or make any findings in connection with the mother’s 
allegations.132  Shortly thereafter the mother left Holland, with the child, for the United States.133
The father filed a petition for the return of the child under The Hague Convention.134  The 
mother asserted that “the return of the child to the Netherlands would present a grave risk to the 
child and would expose the child to physical and psychological harm, and place him in an 
intolerable situation.”135
128 See id. at 930.
129 See T. v. F., (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998) available online at http://www.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0307.htm.
130 See id.
131 See id.
132 See id.
133 See id.
134 See id.
135 Id.
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The child was interviewed by a psychiatric social worker and examined by a pediatrician 
at Yale University Medical School.136  The doctor testified that, although he could not say with 
medical certainty that the child had been sexually abused, based on reasonable medical 
probability, the child had been subjected to anal sexual abuse.137
The Superior Court of Connecticut held that, based upon all the evidence presented, it 
had been established “in total, by clear and convincing evidence” that the father had sexually 
abused the child.138  The court, therefore, concluded that a return of the minor child to Holland 
would cause “grave risk of physical and psychological harm” to him and refused to return the 
child.139
In Walsh v. Walsh,140 the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the 
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts,141 holding that the return of the 
children (M.W. and E.W.) to Ireland would expose them to a grave risk of physical or 
psychological harm, barring their return under The Hague Convention.142
For five years, John Walsh beat his wife Jacqueline.143  Jacqueline was advised by her 
doctor to seek protection and to get a barring order from a court.144  After one beating, Jacqueline 
136 See id.
137 See id.
138 See id.
139 See id.
140
 Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied, Walsh v. Walsh, 531 U.S. 1159 (2001).
141
 In re Walsh, 31 F. Supp. 2d 200 (D. Mass. 1999) (Walsh I).
142 See Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d at 204.
143 See id. at 209.
144 See id. at 209-10.
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reported John to the local police who told her that domestic abuse was not uncommon in their 
town.145  Despite a protection order and agreement that John would vacate their house and let 
Jacqueline and the children stay there, John continued to threaten harm.146  Afraid for the safety 
of her children and herself, Jacqueline left Ireland with the children and flew to the United 
States.147
John filed a petition in the United States District Court of Massachusetts for the return of 
M.W. and E.W. to Ireland pursuant to The Hague Convention.148  Jacqueline’s defense was that 
returning the children would pose a grave risk of physical or psychological harm.149  At trial, 
Jacqueline offered testimony of three witnesses testifying, inter alia, that “John slapped, hit, 
berated, and spit at M.W. . . . he would lock the children in their rooms, . . . and M.W. was often 
present when he abused”150 Jacqueline.  Medical testimony was also offered that M.W. was 
suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and although she had gone into remission since 
being brought to the United States, she would likely suffer a relapse if she were returned to 
Ireland.151  Although John presented no witnesses at trial, and simply denied that he was abusive 
in papers filed with the court, the district court entered an order in John’s favor and ordered the 
children to be returned to Ireland.152  The court concluded that “the evidence does not reveal an 
145 See id. at 210.
146 See id.
147 See id. at 211.
148 See id. at 212.
149 See id.
150 Id.
151 See id. at 211.
152 See id. at 212, citing Walsh I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 208.
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immediate, serious threat to the children’s physical safety that cannot be dealt with by the proper 
Irish authorities.”153
On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the district court “raised the 
Article 13(b) bar higher than the Convention requires.  . . . The Convention does not require that 
the risk be ‘immediate;’ only that it be grave.”154   The court found that given John’s clear and 
long history of spousal abuse, violence directed at his own children, and chronic disobedience of 
court orders, the risk of both physical and psychological harm was high.155
In Tsarbopoulos v. Tsarbopoulos,156 the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Washington found that although the petitioner had not met the requirement for a 
Hague petition, (there was no habitual residence in Greece when the mother removed the 
children to the United States), assuming Greece was the children’s habitual residence, their 
return to Greece “would pose a grave risk of physical and psychological harm or would be an 
intolerable situation.”157
In January 2000, Kristi Tsarbopoulos (“Ms. T.”) removed her three children from 
Greece.158  Anthony Tsarbopoulos (“Mr. T.”) commenced an action for the return of the children 
under The Hague Convention.159  Mt. T. had been physically abusive towards his wife while they 
153 See id. at 217, citing Walsh I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 206.
154 Id. at 218.
155 See id. at 220-21.
156
 Tsarbopoulos v. Tsarbopoulos, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (E.D. Wash. 2001).
157
 Id. at 1047.
158 See id. at 1049.
159 See id. at 1046.
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were dating and after they married.160  At trial, undisputed testimony was presented that the 
youngest child had suffered night tremors since birth, and seldom, if ever slept through the 
night.161  The court found testimony offered by a child therapist that the middle child had been 
physically and sexually abused and associated this abuse with her father to be credible and 
reliable.162  A licensed child mental health therapist concluded that the oldest child had also been 
subjected to significant physical and emotional abuse which he associated with his father.163
Additionally, all three children were diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder.164
Although denied by Mr. T., the Court found the evidence of physical and emotional 
abuse of the children to be persuasive, and that the children would face a grave risk of physical 
and psychological harm if they were returned to Greece.165  The Court found that although Ms. 
T.’s return to the United States was not actionable under the Hague Convention, in the 
alternative, the court concluded that as a matter of law, the exception under Article 13(b) of The 
Hague Convention applied.166  The petition for the return of the children was denied.167
These cases exemplify the inconsistencies in the courts application of the “grave risk” 
standard.  This is due to the lack of clear definition of what constitutes a “grave risk of harm,”
160 See id. at 1050.
161 See id. at 1059.
162 See id.
163 See id. at 1060.
164 See id.
165 See id. at 1060-61.
166 See id. at 1062.
167 See id.
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and the fact that even where the court does find that the standard has been met, the court 
maintains discretion to return the child.
B. What Constitutes a Violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms?
Article 20 of The Hague Convention provides that a Contracting State may refuse to 
order the return of a child if the return of the child would not be permitted by the fundamental 
principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.168  Article 20 has been cited as a defense to not returning a child to their country of 
habitual residence in nine cases of Hague Convention petitions brought in the United States.169
The courts have found that the standard required under Article 20 has not been met in any of 
these cases.170  It should be noted, however, that in two of these cases171 the return of the 
child(ren) was refused on other grounds.  Most of the arguments made with regard to Article 20 
defenses relate to the rights of the parent challenging the request for the return of the child be 
denied, not the rights of the child.  
In Ciotola v. Fiocca, the rights of the child were the basis for the Article 20 claim.172  The
Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, however, rejected the mother's arguments that the court's 
failure to apply a “best interest” test in determining whether the child should be returned violated 
the child's constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.173  In Freier v. Freier,174 the 
168 See Hague Convention, supra note 10, at art. 20. 
169 See INCADAT Database, supra note 74.
170 See id. 
171 See id. The two cases where the return of the child was refused on other grounds were Steffen F. v. Severina P., 
966 F. Supp. 922 (D. Ariz. 1997), where the court refused the return of the child based on article 13(b) and Journe v. 
Journe, 911 F. Supp. 43 (D.P.R. 1995), where the court refused the return of the children based on article 13(a).
172 Ciotola v. Fiocca, 684 N.E.2d 763.
173 See id. at 35.
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan rejected the mother’s argument 
that a temporary injunction prohibiting her from leaving Israel, until the divorce and custody 
proceedings were settled, violated her human rights and fundamental freedoms.175 The Court 
specifically noted that the argument focused primarily on the mother’s rights even though it is 
not clear that The Hague Convention's focus under Article 20 is on the parents' rights as opposed 
to the child's rights.176  Similarly, in Fabri v. Pritikin-Fabri,177 the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois rejected the mother’s argument that a return order would 
violate her right to travel under the U.S. Constitution and violate her right to privacy in her 
family relationships.178  The court reasoned that an order for the child to return to Italy was not 
an order for the mother to return, she was free to remain in the United States.179  The court also 
noted that the mother had not offered any evidence that the Italian courts would not treat her 
custody claims fairly.180
Although included in The Convention as a “public policy clause,”181 no court has found 
that a petitioner has been able to meet this standard.   Further definition, supported by examples, 
would enable petitioners to appropriately assert Article 20 as a defense to the return of a child 
and enable courts to make consistent and appropriate findings.  Forcing a child to return to an 
174
 Freier v. Freier, 969 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
175 See id. at 443.
176 See id. at 444.
177
 Fabri v. Pritikin-Fabri, 221 F. Supp. 2d 859 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
178 See id. at 873.
179 See id.
180 See id.
181 See Pérez-Vera, supra note 5, at ¶ 31. 
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abusive environment should be recognized as a violation of the “fundamental principles of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms”182 of the child.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Advantages and Challenges of the Convention
The Convention is an international treaty that provides a mechanism to bring about the 
prompt return of children who have been wrongfully removed or retained outside their country of 
habitual residence in violation of rights of custody existing and actually exercised in the child’s 
country of habitual residence.183  The Convention is an important tool for reuniting families 
across international borders and in deterring potential abductions.184  In the United States, Hague 
cases constitute about thirty percent of the total volume of abduction cases handled by the 
Department of State and represent over fifty percent of the children returned.185
Article 6 of the Convention requires that each Contracting State designate a Central 
Authority to discharge the duties imposed by the Convention upon such authority.186  Central 
Authorities, amongst the Contracting States, “are to cooperate with each other and promote 
cooperation amongst the competent authorities in their respective States to secure the prompt 
182 See Hague Convention, supra note 10, at art. 20.
183 See U.S. Dep’t State, 2005 Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction, available at 
http://travel.state.gov/family/abduction/hague_issues/hague_issues_2537.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) [hereinafter 
US 2005 Report].
184 See id.
.
185 See id. During the period from October 1, 2003 – September 20, 2004, the Department of State assisted in the 
return to the United States of 292 children abducted or wrongfully retained overseas. See id. Of this number, 154 
children were returned in cases in which a Hague application was filed. See id.
186 See Hague Convention, supra note 10, at art. 6.
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return of children”187 and to achieve the objectives of the Convention.  Any person or institution 
claiming that a child has been wrongfully removed or retained may apply to the Central 
Authority of the child’s habitual residence or to the Central Authority of any other Contracting 
State for assistance in securing the return of the child.188  The Assistant Secretary of State for 
Consular Affairs has been designated as the Central Authority for the Unites States under the 
Hague Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act.189
The Hague Convention was designed to address the fact that because every country has 
its own judicial system, there was a need for uniform legislation which would help recover 
children abducted across international borders, return them promptly to their place of habitual 
residence, and ensure custody and access are respected between Contracting States.190  One of 
the most frustrating elements for parents whose child has been abducted is that laws and court 
orders of one country are not usually recognized in a foreign country and therefore not directly 
enforceable abroad.191  The Hague Convention provides a basis for dealing with this exact issue.
187 See id. at art. 7.  Responsibilities of the Central Authority include: a) to discover the whereabouts of a child who 
has been wrongfully removed or retained; b) to prevent further harm to the child or prejudice to interested parties by 
taking or causing to be taken provisional measures; c) to secure the voluntary return of the child or to bring about an 
amicable resolution of the issues; d) to exchange, where desirable, information relating to the social background of 
the child; e) to provide information of a general character as to the law of their State in connection with the 
application of the Convention; f) to initiate or facilitate the institution of juridical or administrative proceedings with 
a view to obtaining the return of the child and, in proper case, to make arrangements for organizing or securing the 
effective exercise of rights of access; g) where the circumstances so require, to provide or facilitate the provisions of 
legal aid and advice, including the participation of legal counsel and advisors; h) to provide such administrative 
arrangements as may be necessary and appropriate to secure the safe return of the child; and i) to keep each other 
informed with respect to the operation of the Convention and, as far as possible, to eliminate any obstacles to its 
application. See id.
188 See id. at art. 8 (Generally, a petition for return is filed in the Contracting State to which the child has been taken, 
and it is the Central Authorities of the Contracting States of the child’s habitual residence and where the child has 
been taken to that provide the majority of the assistance).
189 See Exec. Order No. 12,648, 34 Fed. Reg. 30,637 (Aug. 11, 1988) Relating to the Implementation of the 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.
190 See Lowe-Action Agenda, supra note 29 at iv.
191 See Consular Affairs, supra note 45.
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The Convention applies only to wrongful removals between Contracting States occurring 
after its entry into force in those States.192  Although there are currently seventy-five countries 
which are party to the Convention, the United States has a treaty relationship under the 
Convention with only fifty-five other countries.193  When a new country accedes to the 
Convention, the United States Department of State will review that country’s accession to 
determine whether the necessary legal and institutional mechanisms are in place to fully 
implement the Convention.194  It is only when the Department of State concludes that a country 
has the capability to be an effective treaty partner that the United States will recognize their 
accession and the Convention will come into force between the two countries.195  While the 
potential effectiveness of the Convention in resolving cases of international parental child 
abduction and deterring future abductions has been recognized,196 the actual impact is limited 
until there is more universal adoption and effective implementation of the Convention.
192 See Hague Convention, supra note 10, at art. 35.
193 See US 2005 Report, supra note 181; see also U.S. Dep’t State, Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the 
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction – Party Countries and Effective Dates with U.S., available at 
http://travel.state.gov/family/abduction/hague_issues/hague_issues_1487.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2006). The 
countries with which the U.S. has a treaty relationship are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Belize, 
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkin Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Columbia, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia (Federal Republic of), 
and Zimbabwe.
194 See id.
195 See id.
196 See id.
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Although it is clear that the intent of the drafters of the Convention was that any 
exceptions be interpreted narrowly,197 another challenge with the Convention is the lack of 
definition of terms used in the exceptions, in particular: what constitutes a grave risk of harm?  
As previously discussed, this has resulted in inconsistent interpretation and application of the 
Convention both between Contracting States and within courts of contracting States, including 
the United States.198  Without further clarification and definition as to what constitutes a “grave 
risk of harm” the inconsistencies will continue to be pervasive and likely lead to “forum 
shopping,” particularly in a country such as the United States where the State Courts and the 
United States district courts both have original jurisdiction.
According to the International Forum on Parental Child Abduction held in September 
1998, on average, about forty-five percent of all Hague applications for the return of a child end 
with a court order for return.199  Rates for return in individual countries, however, range from a 
low of five percent to a high of ninety-five percent.200  Further, while an average of twenty-three 
percent of applications end with a judicial refusal, fluctuations from country to country range 
from six percent to seventy-five percent.201  This data is further evidence of the inconsistent 
interpretation and application of The Convention by the Contracting States.
197 See Pérez-Vera, supra note 5, at ¶ 34 (exceptions are to be interpreted in a restrictive fashion if the Convention is 
not to become a dead letter); see also Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51 
Fed. Reg. at 10,509 (any exception must be drawn narrowly lest their application undermine the express purpose of 
the Convention – to effect the prompt return of abducted children).
198 See OJJDP Family Resource Guide, supra note 30 at 50. See also Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204 overturning In 
re Walsh, 31 F. Supp. 2d 200, Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153 overturning Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240. 
199 See Lowe–Action Agenda, supra note 29 at 7.
200 See id
.
201 See id. at 8.
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The need for clear definition of terms and uniformity of application, with regard to the 
Article 13(b) exceptions, is particularly critical since under the terms of the Convention, courts 
are not permitted to consider the merits of the case when making a determination with regard to 
the return of a child, and must respect the decision of the court having jurisdiction controlling 
custody.  Following a strict interpretation of the Convention, a child should be returned despite 
domestic violence, abuse and other severe family law matters, only when there is no other 
alternative available.  It is imperative that a balance be struck between respect for the laws and 
court orders of Contracting States and recognition that ongoing exposure to incidents of domestic 
violence and abuse presents empirical evidence of a situation which would subject the child to 
“grave risk of physical or psychological harm” or “otherwise place the child in an intolerable 
situation.”  While the Convention is clearly concerned with protecting children against the 
harmful effects of international abduction, the harmful effects of returning a child to an abusive 
parent must also be considered.  
There is also no obligation, under the terms of the Convention, for Contracting States to 
take responsibility for the safety of children returned to their country of habitual residence under 
the Convention.202  Under the Convention a potential grave risk of harm can, at times, be 
mitigated sufficiently by the acceptance of “undertakings” and sufficient guarantees of 
performance of those undertakings by the respective parties,203 resulting in a child’s return.  This 
approach allows courts to evaluate the placement options and legal safeguards in the country of 
habitual residence to preserve the child's safety.204  While this approach may best allow for the 
202 See id. at iv.
203 See Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d at 219.
204 See id.
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achievement of the goal of the Convention of returning the child to their county of habitual 
residence, there is no provision in the Convention for the country of habitual residence to 
monitor and ensure compliance with these undertakings.  
B. Recommendations
Although the Convention has been in force since 1976, there are currently only seventy-
five Contracting States to the Convention.205  There are many countries in large parts of the 
world that are not signatories to the Convention.206  Outgoing abduction cases to non-Hague 
countries are the most difficult to resolve largely because courts do not automatically honor 
custody orders made by judges in other countries.207
The United States has actively encouraged countries to accede to the Convention, 
recognizing its potential effectiveness not just in resolving cases of international parental child 
abduction, but also in deterring future abductions.208  International pressure must be asserted to 
expand membership of the Hague Convention.209  Additionally, countries that are members of 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child need to be reminded of their 
obligations to promote accessions.210
The basic issue of custody rights is not within the scope of The Convention, therefore the 
Convention must necessarily “coexist with the rules of each Contracting State on applicable law 
205 See Convention Status Table, supra note 9.
206 See Lowe-Action Agenda, supra note 29 at vi.
207 See Hoff, supra note 64, at 100. 
208 See US 2005 Report, supra note 181.
209 See Lowe-Action Agenda, supra note 29 at vi.
210 See id.
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and on the recognition and enforcement of foreign decrees.”211  While it is imperative that the 
judicial and administrative authorities of the Contracting States are respected, it is also important 
that there be consistency with regard to the application of the Convention.  There must be a more 
common approach to the application of the exceptions provided in The Convention.  
In 1990, the United States Congress passed a resolution expressing their sense that “for 
purposes of determining child custody, credible evidence of physical abuse of one’s spouse 
should create a statutory presumption that it is detrimental to the child to be placed in the custody 
of the abusive spouse.”212  While this resolution dealt explicitly with the issue of custody, which 
is out of the scope of the Convention, it clearly reflects the belief that credible evidence of 
spousal abuse presumptively presents a grave risk of harm to the child.  Credible evidence of 
domestic violence and/or child abuse should be included in the definition of a “grave risk of 
harm” in the Convention and, therefore, be considered as meeting the standard for an exception 
under Article 13(b) of the Convention by all courts in all Contracting States.
Additionally, courts in Contracting States need to recognize the significant impact of 
domestic violence and child abuse on children.  The courts must recognize that forcing a child to 
return to an abuse environment violates the “fundamental principles of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms”213 of the child. International standards regarding fundamental principles
of human rights and fundamental principals must be established. These standards must 
effectively co-exist with local law and be applied consistently to protect the interests of the 
children.
211 See Pérez-Vera, supra note 5, at ¶ 39.
212
 H.R. Con. Res. 172, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 104 Stat. 5184 (Oct. 9, 1990) (Expressing the sense of the Congress 
that, for purposes of determining child custody, credible evidence of physical abuse of one’s spouse should create a 
statutory presumption that it is detrimental to the child to be placed in the custody of the abusive spouse).
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 See Hague Convention, supra note 10, at art. 20. 
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Where the courts determine that there is not clear and convincing evidence for an 
exception under Article 13(b) or Article 20 of the Convention, and the child is returned, the 
Convention must provide that judges and central authorities work closely together to ensure that 
the child is properly safeguarded and protected.214  This is particularly true in the case where the 
child has been returned subject to acceptance of undertakings applicable to either the party 
seeking the return or the party responsible for the wrongful removal.  The Central Authority of 
each Contracting State should have an obligation to protect the welfare of children returned to 
that country under the Convention.215  This obligation could be easily incorporated into Article 
7(h) of the Convention requiring that central authorities “provide such administrative 
arrangements as may be necessary and appropriate to secure the safe return of the child.”216
V. CONCLUSION
Each year more than 200,000 children are abducted by family members and 58,000 by 
non-family members in the United States alone.217  While the abduction of a child by a parent 
may be traumatic for the child, as well as one or both of the parents, the return of the child to an 
abusive home may be more traumatic or even deadly.  The Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction is an attempt to address the increasing incidence of 
international parental child abduction, and secure the prompt return of the child to their country 
of habitual residence.  This return must not, however, be at the expense of the child’s welfare and 
must more effectively and consistently consider what is “In the Best Interest of the Child.” 
214 See Lowe-Action Agenda, supra note 29 at vi.
215 See id.
216 See Hague Convention, supra note 10, at art. 7(h).
217 See White House Fact Sheet, supra note 1.
